

Security Trifecta – Overview of Vulnerabilities in the Racing Industry

Gus Fritschie


December 11, 2013



SeNet International Gaming Labs "Don't Gamble with Security"



Who We Are – SeNet International





Who We Are – Gus Fritschie

- CTO of SeNet International
- Subject Matter Expert in Gaming and iGaming security
- Presented at multiple conferences, including Defcon on iGaming issues
- Written multiple articles on gaming security for both print and online publications
- Most importantly I want sites and organizations to be safe and secure because I am also a player



Follow on Twitter @gfritschie

 $\ensuremath{\textcircled{C}}$ SeNet International Corp. 2013




Why This Talk?

- The future of gaming, if not the Internet is tied closely to it. Even those components that may not be specifically tied to iGaming (i.e. OTB) still require a certain level of security.
- While the racing industry has had a head start (thanks to UIEGA) it only leads by a couple of lengths, and when it comes to security it is neck-to-neck.
- We need to learn from past mistakes in other sectors in order to avoid them in the future.
- Often security is seen as a cost and something we don't think about until there is a problem (similar to flooded basement). However, this trend needs to change and we need to become more proactive compared to reactive.



How is Online Racing Security Different From This?





- There is no difference!
- Racing and iGaming face the same problems and need the same level of protection as other verticals.
- Areas that need to be taken into account include:
 - Application Security
 - Network Security
 - System Security
 - Database
 - Mobile
 - Physical
 - And more.....



- You will never be 100% secure, the key is to understand the risks you face and with that information make informed business decisions.
- In order to be 100% secure you would need to do this......





Are Compliance Standards the Answer?



8



Compliance != Secure

- But it is a starting point and better than nothing.
- Need to approach it from more than a paperwork exercise.
- The problem is most of the compliance standards (current gaming included) are not strict enough and leave organizations with a false sense of security.



- The answer is a comprehensive, enterprise solution across all facets. Too long of an answer for this brief presentation.
- In my opinion two ways organizations are most likely to get compromised.
 - 1. Attacks via the application (both web and mobile)
 - 2. Social engineering attacks
- Let's look closer at the first method.....



Types of Application Attacks

OWASP TOP 10 – 2013

- A1-Injection
- A2 Broken Authentication and Session Management
- A3 Cross-Site Scripting (XSS)
- A4 Insecure Direct Object References
- A5 Security Misconfiguration
- A6 Sensitive Data Exposure
- A7 Missing Function Level Access Control
- A8 Cross-Site Request Forgery (CSRF)
- A9 Using Known Vulnerable Components
- A10 Unvalidated Redirects and Forwards



Security Needs to be Baked into the SDLC


•Risk-based approach vs. compliance-only focus.

> •Security integration to system development is critical to front-end design

- Examples:
- Audit logging design
- possibly include redundancy, retention, and reliability (unintentional 3 r's there);
- Session design
- possibly include concurrency control, lock, identification, replay
- Access, authentication, and authorization (intentional 3 a's there)
- Error handling design
- Unit test automation by check-in gates
- Code coverage
- Design for functional testing
- Information input restriction
- RBAC
- Partitioning
- Information validation
- Rules engine/input validation, app firewall



Examples









Backend Password and Username Exposed in Request

/php/fw/php_BRIS_BatchAPI/2.3/Games/History?jsonpcallback=jQuery19106022662831152568_1381845203790&ip=172.20.18.156&authKey=92C4BB4C24A855C587918CFFF598A0B0&u sername=strikeit&password=1tg00d&affid=5000&account=200270567&output=json&limit=0&_=1381845203791 HTTP/1.1
HOST: WWW COM
User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (X11; Ubuntu; Linux x86 64; rv:24.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/24.0
Accept: text/javascript, application/javascript, application/ecmascript, application/x-ecmascript, */*; q=0.01
Accept-Language: en-US,en;q=0.5
Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate
X-Requested-With: XMLHttpRequest
Referer: https://www /?fund
Cookie: SAID=f1U%3D; optimizelySegments=%7B%7D; optimizelyEndUserId=oeu1381844956162r0.06970016944913016; optimizelyBuckets=%7B%7D; has js=1;
utma=66849459.1587085055.1381844958.1381844958.1381844958.1; utmb=66849459.14.10.1381844958; utmc=66849459;
utmz=66849459.1381844958.1.1.utmcsr=(direct) utmccn=(direct) utmcmd=(none); LUCKITY REGISTRATION=%78%22Fields%22%3A%78%7D%7D;
ID=5000.DB0D11FE81F2C0643F7C42EB06D67D18EE6F1ED011FA5754BFD5EE8E37E2F6089042E636BA7632242262AAEE757055D0268421A448476A366BA4A05EE620074A.;
ACCT=5000.8A0315AE84F3C0313B7A4AEF07D62418EF694CDE45AD0703BF84EB8962E4AD0B9D17B531B222697F726DA7E4767705D772D02CA4404E63613FA4F758B179514C.; CAID=f1U%3D;
ID SECURE=B28E090EA0526061EFA8204DB902CD11C4D267C1F5E87EF7EDA4BE4541568C6C22DE4757BF5C8A69F2E15F56C62E33A0221F8EE5A550C029763B4A5DC2EBE0E6;
SESS8cfaaedb35e158c4b58326d305b638a0=KJq46gaIdD2jHzC3khc9rhDYIUWKsNgmKoH YMOWQk8;
SSESS8cfaaedb35e158c4b58326d305b638a0=URVL2SWp1GybhLL1Vrk1LZFZvpHv9cdBJhnHhW9nZbM; AUTH KEY=92C4BB4C24A855C587918CFFF598A0B0;
AUTH USER INFO=%78%22account%22%3A%22200270567%22%2C%22firstname%22%3A%22Gus%22%2C%22lastname%22%3A%22Fritschie%22%2C%22username%22%3A%220 1%22%2C%22e
mail\$22%3A%22%40hotmail.com%22%2C%22state%22%3A%22MD%22%7D; loggedin=TRUE; STATE=MD; optimizelyPendingLogEvents=%5B%5D
Connection: keep-alive



Backend Password and Username Exposed in Request (Cont.)

php/fw/php_BRIS_BatchAPI/2.3/Games/Payouts? ip=172.20.18.156&username=strikeit&password=1tg0 0d&affid=5000&output=json HTTP/1.1





123456



Weak Password Policy





Password:	Re-enter Password:	
	6-10 lowercase letters and numbers, no spaces or symbols.	



Password Stored in Clear-text in Database

Using the forgot password function the password is sent via email and is the same password as initially set. This indicates passwords are stored in clear-text.

Dear Gus		
You recently requested your passwor	rd.	
Your username is:		
Your password is: password1		
<pre>If you did not make this password request, or > Phone - 866. (866.) from > Email - customerservice@</pre>	r if you have any questions regarding your account, Customer n 10:30AM to 11:00PM Eastern Time	Servi
Thank you and best of luck betting the races!		
Sincerely,		
The Team Road, , PA P: 866.		
F: 866.		



Cross-site Scripting (XSS)

GET /fe/MyRewards.aspx?popup="><script>alert('xss')</script>1&xbOsid=c7eaaOcaOec4dda4e1dbc44df2bccff2 HTTP/1.1
Host: com
User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (X11; Ubuntu; Linux x86_64; rv:25.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/25.0
Accept: text/html,application/xhtml+xml,application/xml;q=0.9,*/*;q=0.8
Accept-Language: en-US,en;q=0.5
Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate
Referer: https:// .om/fe/main.aspx?xbOsid=c7eaaOcaOec4dda4e1dbc44df2bccff2
Cookie: tzo_0=300; _csh=c7eaaucaOec4dda4e1dbc44df2bccff2
Connection: keep-alive



Cross-site Scripting (XSS)

	(w🖬) - Mozilla Fi	refox			
A https://.	"com/fe/My	Rewards.aspx?popup=	1&xbOsid=c7eaa0ca0ec4c	lda4e1dbc44df2bccff2	ි 🕐 🤗
	Rewards Summary	Rewards Statement	Redeem Points		
	Rewards Status				
		User Name			
		Total Balance	0 Points		
		Rewards Level	None		
	Rewards Summar	ry –			
	Through Novemb	ber 14, 2013			
	Total A	mount Wag	XSS		
		Days Wag		and the second second second	
				Level Achieved	
			ОК	Gold	
				Platinum	
		\$96,000	D N/A	Diamond	



Conclusion

- This introduction presentation just touched on some of the security issues that the Online Racing Industry need to take into account.
- All examples used were discovered via passive analysis, no active or scanning was performed on sites.
- Less than a few hours were used to locate these "low-hanging" vulnerabilities, certainly more exist.
- During the rest of this panel discussion we will dive deeper into some of these attack vectors and others that you need to be aware of.